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21. Introduction
Over the past few decades, regional and international organizations have proliferated at a
tremendous rate. In particular, the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) alone has
increased fourfold to over 300 in number within the last two decades. This dense network
consists mainly of bilateral PTAs. Today, very few countries are not party to any PTA, many
having concluded over a dozen agreements. Over 50 percent of global trade is conducted on the
basis of PTA rules, and this rapid increase of trade regionalism reflects important changes in the
modern global economy (Manger et al. 2012), as well as the extent to which PTAs influence
international transactions. An extensive literature is devoted to identifying political and economic
determinants for the establishment of PTAs. However, an essential component of international
politics that considerably influences the formation of PTAs has been overlooked in all existing
research: diplomacy.
Economic diplomacy has become a central component of foreign ministries’ portfolios, with
these branches of government readily providing data and assistance to pursue trade and
international investment growth. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade goes so
far as to list international trade as one of the foundations of its economic-diplomacy agenda. Its
stated aim in trade promotion is to: ‘pursue trade liberalisation through bilateral, regional and
global trade agreements that open up new markets for Australian exporters and sustain a strong,
rules based architecture for global trade’ (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
2015).
We extend existing theories of economic diplomacy to incorporate PTA formation. Where
diplomats work to facilitate trade and investment by decreasing transaction costs (Rose 2007),
they also can influence the coordinated scheduled reductions in these costs through bilateral
trade agreements. The nature of diplomatic ties matters as well; high-level diplomats have greater
access to resources and officials, while low-level diplomatic ties lack these advantages.
Consequently, country pairs with high-level diplomatic relations should be more likely to enter
into PTAs than those without these ties. Furthermore, diplomats have personal incentives to
promote PTA formation, as successful negotiations signal polished professional skills and may
contribute significantly to professional advancement. If diplomats make PTAs more likely
between country pairs, this provides a clear mechanism between economic diplomacy and
growth in bilateral trade.
We test our argument against a dataset consisting of 351 PTAs 1 and directed dyadic diplomatic
links between all countries (from Bayer 2006) spanning the years 1960-2005, finding evidence
that high-level diplomatic ties exert a strong influence on the formation of PTAs between
members of a dyad. Low-level ties do not exhibit a consistent relationship with trade agreements.
2. Literature Review
Economic Diplomacy in Foreign Services
With the growth of international organizations and institutions as forums for the traditional tasks
of diplomatic corps, economic diplomacy has become a primary mission. This shift in emphasis
3has somewhat coincided with the growth of international trade, and embassies and consulates
alike (as well as lower-level forms of government representation) play a key role in assisting
private actors in overcoming the remaining transaction costs and formal and informal barriers
associated with foreign transactions (Kostecki and Naray 2007; Naray 2010). By doing so, these
influential diplomatic officials enable the development and maintenance of export markets by
paving the way free to trade (Lee and Hudson, 2004; Bergeijk, 2009; Yakop and van Bergeijk,
2011).
Empirical research on economic diplomacy is limited, but typically interdisciplinary in nature and
straddles the fields of international political economy, international economics and international
relations (Bergeijk et al.2011; Okano-Heijmans 2011). International-relations studies are the most
common, and frequently assess commercial elements within the broader scope of diplomatic or
foreign relations (Morrow et al. 1998; Coolsaet 2004; Lee 2004; Neumayer 2007; Rana 2007;
Stringer 2007; Maliniak and Plouffe 2011; Poulsen 2015; Poulsen and Aisbett 2016). Despite the
merits of this state-centred approach, the perspective has been criticised for a lack of
examination of economic diplomacy’s commercial implications (Lee and Hudson, 2004).
Related political-economy and international business research examines the effect of economic
diplomacy on international trade flows. Rose (2007), the first to empirically investigate whether
trade follows the flag, finds a sizeable link between foreign consulates and bilateral exports. More
recent work has found analogous results for permanent diplomatic missions in transition
countries and ad valorum tariff reductions (Afman and Maurel 2010) and state visits (Nitsch
2007). Yakop and Bergeijk (2009) identify variation in the trade effect attributable to trade
partners’ levels of economic development. Head and Ries (2010) interestingly find Canada’s
trade missions to have no impact on trade flows. However, this seems to be a unique result in
the literature, as economic diplomacy generally is linked to growth in trade flows for all dyads
where at least one trading partner is a developing country (van Veenstra et al. 2011; Creusen and
Lejour 2012).
Other research unpacks the effects of different forms of diplomatic representation on bilateral
trade. Van Bergeijk et al. (2011) conclude that embassies have on average a larger impact on
trade compared to consulates, while honorary consulates do not add value at all. The meta-
analysis of Moons and Bergeijk (2013) confirms that the impact of economic diplomacy is more
pronounced when embassies are used as an explanatory variable compared to studies using trade
missions, state visits or consulates. A general drawback of all these studies is restricted
generalizability due to limited data availability. However, all studies report that diplomatic ties
promote and facilitate trade.
While economic diplomacy can be systematically linked to increases in bilateral exports, the
mechanisms at play in this relationship remain relatively undefined. It is generally expected that
diplomats lobby host governments to secure national political and economic interests (Okano-
Heijmans 2008). These may be limited to the dyad, but are also likely reflect significant
multilateral and regional considerations (Bayner and Woolcock 2007; Maliniak and Plouffe 2011).
However, beyond these activities and providing information to private-sector actors, our
understanding of what entails economic diplomacy remains relatively limited when compared to
its effects.
4Determinants of Trade Agreements
The dramatic growth and range of scope of PTAs over the past two decades vividly
demonstrates the importance of transnational economic flows in the modern global economy.
PTAs are primarily identified as useful means to consolidate the results of intense lobbying for
favourable trade rules as they provide exceptions to the application of the WTO’s most favoured
nation (MFN) arrangement. Countries involved in a PTA share preferential terms with a small
selection of other countries and thereby conduct commerce on even better terms (Bagwell and
Staiger 2001). This discriminatory element makes trade relatively costly for non-members and
induces them to either seek to join the established PTA, or obtain similar policy concessions of
their own through a new agreement (Baldwin 1996; Egger and Larch 2008; Baldwin and
Jaimovich 2012).
Because PTAs are attractive institutions with tangible membership benefits to joining
governments, the determinants of PTA membership are an important topic of research.
Research on influential determinants of PTAs has focused on the effect of increasing economic
similarity (Baier and Bergstand 2004; Baier et al. 2014), interest-group lobbying (Mattli 1999;
Chase 2005; Dür 2007; Plouffe 2012), domestic institutions (Mansfield et al. 2000 and 2008;
Baccini 2012), the influence of specific international organizations (Pevehouse 2005; Pevehouse
and Russett 2006), endogeneity resulting from natural trading partners (Baier and Bergstrand
2007 and 2009; Egger et al. 2008) and political agents’ interests (Elsig 2007; Elsig and Dupont
2011). Recent research has also begun to examine variations in the scope and implementation of
PTAs and other economic agreements, ranging from domestic institutions and implementation
of provisions (Büthe and Milner 2014; Gray 2014; Haftel 2013; Baccini and Kim 2012), to the
relationship between depth and flexibility (Baccini et al. 2015; Johns 2014; Kucik and Reinhardt
2008; Pelc 2009; Rosendorff and Milner 2001). While many aspects of trade agreements have
been studied, the role of diplomats has remained overlooked.
3. Diplomats and PTAs
While the political and economic determinants of PTAs have been subject to extensive scrutiny,
the importance of those representing countries and their incentives have been ignored as a non-
economic factor in PTA creation. Two factors lie in the relationship between diplomats and PTA
formation. First, diplomats have a personal incentive to negotiate and conclude treaties. Second,
embassy-level missions have greater resources and capabilities than lower-priority diplomatic
delegations, which should make PTA formation more likely among country pairs with
ambassadorial ties.
High-level diplomatic representation between countries – such as embassies – have a positive
influence on the likelihood of the ratification of a PTA between these countries, particularly
when these links are reciprocated. Contrastingly, low-level ties, such as chargés d’affaires, should
have a lesser effect on PTAs, as these offices are largely temporary or formalities and lack the
resources and capabilities of higher priority diplomatic missions. High-level representation
signifies important political and strategic considerations (Maliniak and Plouffe 2011), which both
foster cooperation and have been linked to institutions such as PTAs (Gartzke 2007; Rose 2007)
and BITs (Poulsen and Aisbett 2016).
5The Importance of High-Level Ties
High-level representation between countries reflects the importance of a bilateral relationship.
Direct diplomatic representation fosters numerous benefits, including increased international
prestige, improved communication, information gathering, and the promotion of political,
economic interests, as well as fostering cultural exchange (Keeley 2000; Kinne 2014).
However, these benefits do not come freely: diplomatic representation is a costly endeavour.2
Compared to low-level missions, embassies are particularly costly to establish and maintain;
consequently, they are relatively rare among dyads, as states behave strategically when
determining hosts for potential embassies. Among the concerns that factor into this calculus are
economic interdependence, power considerations, and shared geopolitical goals (Bayer 2006;
Maliniak and Plouffe 2011). For the state, these goals contribute to the formation of bilateral and
regional agreements; they additionally foster cooperation in international governance.
While ambassadorial ties are driven by costs and a desire for close bilateral relationships, the lack
of a resident ambassador may point to similar considerations. For example, when a non-resident
ambassador is tasked with multiple countries, a lower-ranking officer – a chargé d’affaires – acts
as the highest-ranking resident representative. Where the cost of direct representation is not the
chief concern, the use of a long-term chargé d’affaires may signify bilateral tensions or
displeasure.3 Finally, where broader political considerations are concerned, chargés d’affaires
enable resident representation without the pomp and circumstance that surrounds the
appointment of an ambassador, as chargés d’affaires are received by a foreign minister rather
than a head of state. These political dynamics also feed into the incentives of the most senior
state representative: while an ambassador may seek to actively and publicly promote his or her
state’s interests through means such as a PTA,4 a chargé d’affaires may simply pursue the status
quo while in a temporary appointment, or, where permanent, will seek quieter avenues when
pursuing foreign-policy goals.
The influence of diplomatic links on PTA formation goes beyond merely representing the
importance of a bilateral relationship. Embassies are often better staffed than lower-level
missions and have greater access to resources, allowing for specialization in tasks and a broader
scope of issues that can be actively addressed.5 Additionally, diplomatic staff may come from a
range of bureaucratic pathways, bringing with them a variety of experiences and specializations
with which to support the embassy’s goals.
Diplomatic Incentives
In addition to the state’s strategic goals, diplomats have personal professional incentives to form
PTAs, as completing a trade agreement with a trading partner can lead to significant professional
benefits. Negotiating an agreement serves as a strong signal of the application of highly
developed professional skills; successfully concluding a negotiation is a significant achievement
that can form the basis for enhanced career prospects. While diplomatic staff can point to the
text resulting from negotiations as a tangible accomplishment, this is evidence of other important
intangible skills, such as demonstrating a range of expertise, developing valuable negotiating
skills, and working successfully as part of a team.6 Consequently, diplomats can use contributions
6to agreements as leverage for the basis for promotions, improved salary, and favourable
postings.7
These private incentives overlap with diplomats’ unique position to form and execute foreign
economic policy. Diplomats are ideally situated to negotiate: along with private knowledge of
their government’s political and economic goals and private actors’ interests, they cultivate
specialised bodies of knowledge relating to their host countries.8 Consequently, diplomats have
both the incentive and ability to reduce sources of uncertainty, risk, and transaction costs; they
can identify and mobilise key stake-holders and lead negotiations to a successful resolution.
4. Data Description
We examine the effects of diplomatic representation on PTA formation using a dyadic panel
covering the years 1960-2005, in five-year intervals.9 The dependent variable is a binary indicator
that captures the existence of a PTA between members of a dyad, sourced from the Global
Preferential Trade Agreements Database (GPTAD), sourced through the World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITS) (World Bank 2014).
The variables of interest measure the strength of diplomatic ties between dyad members, sourced
on a five-year basis from Bayer’s (2006) contribution to the Correlates of War (CoW) database
(Singer and Small 1973). The different levels of diplomatic representation in decreasing order of
importance are: ambassador or high commissioner, minister or envoy, chargé d’affaires or
counsellor and, finally, no evidence of any diplomatic representation. Since the end of the
Second World War, minister/envoy-led legations have become exceptionally rare, as countries
have followed United Nations doctrine regarding the equality of sovereign states, causing
countries relying on legations as their forms of bilateral representation to eventually upgrade the
status of these ties (or remove them altogether).10 Consequently, we focus our analysis on
ambassadorial and chargé d’affaires/counsellor-level ties.
Table 1. Distribution of Bilateral Diplomatic Relations among Dyads, 1970-2005
Ambassador Chargé d’affaires No Representation
Ambassador 14,169 1,307 6,924
Chargé d’affaires 1,307 152 920
No Representation 6,924 920 68,292
Note: Based on the 10-year lags, leaving 91,764 potential observations. Ministers are included with chargés
d’affaires, as there are only 42 observations involving ministers. Table A2 in the Appendix depicts the correlation
coefficients for lags of the diplomatic terms, illustrating the changing nature of representation over time; Table A3
lists each of the ministerial legations from 1975-2005.
Table 1 depicts the distribution of diplomatic relationships between countries. Mutual
ambassador-level ties are the most common form of diplomatic engagement, where they exist, at
over 15% of all observations. Dyads involving chargés d’affaires are much less common, with
mutual chargés d’affaires making up a minute portion of all dyads. It is relatively common for the
strength of diplomatic ties to be unbalanced, with nearly 9% of all observations involving a single
ambassador and in reciprocation, either a chargé d’affaires or no representation. Despite strong
evidence that the global diplomatic network is extremely dense, there is considerable variation in
the nature of ties, even within dyads, indicating the presence of costs that prevent countries from
extending representation on a bilateral basis across the globe (Maliniak and Plouffe 2011).11
7It is important to note that a lack of diplomatic representation does not directly imply a bad
relationship between countries, as countries can still recognize each other. However, it would be
virtually impossible to capture data on these forms of representation as well. We create two
dummy variables for each category of diplomatic representation to indicate mutual or unilateral
diplomatic ties. To account for the potential endogeneity of diplomatic relations – where
diplomatic representation may be increased as part of a push to conclude a trade agreement, each
dummy variable is lagged by ten years (Lawrence 1998). This also aids in capturing the effect of
time required for diplomats to ramp up the scope of their trade-promotion efforts.12
Developing the Model
We control for a number of economic and political factors, as indicated by existing research on
both PTA formation and the relationship between economic diplomacy and trade. Our empirical
model is based on two literatures, namely the determinants of trade agreements (Baier and
Bergstrand 2004; 2009; 2014) and the impact of diplomacy on trade flows (Rose 2007; Yakop
and van Bergeijk 2011).
Following the ubiquitous gravity model of trade, we control for dyad members’ proximity as a way
to indicate bilateral trade costs. As distance increases, so do costs associated with contracting,
transportation and transactions. This decreases the likelihood of trade occurring, which in turn
decreases the probability of a PTA (Frankel et al. 1995, 1996, 1998; Frankel 1997). A country
pair’s distance also captures political influences. Among other examples, the history of the
European Union (EU) and the Monroe Doctrine suggest that political interests in forming close
ties with foreign countries rise with geographical proximity. When dyad members are
geographically closer to each other, the probability of a PTA increases. The logged distance
between countries is based on capital cities and available from Mayer and Zignago (2006). For
proximity, we have reversed the sign of this distance measure to facilitate interpretation: greater
proximity between dyad members means that trade and PTA formation are more likely.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004), we include a measure of a dyad’s remoteness from the rest
of the world. Remoteness captures whether dyad members are located on a shared continent and
their potential to trade with the rest of the world. We specify this formally in the appendix; the
calculation is the same as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), Egger and Larch (2008), and Baldwin
and Jaimovich (2012). Remoteness is very closely related to work on the theoretical underpinnings
of the gravity model (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004), so it is appropriate to include in our
specifications. The more remote from the rest of the world dyad members are, the more likely
they are to form a PTA.
To complete the gravity portion of the model, we include GDPs for both countries in the dyad
(GDPi and GDPj). Research on the economic implications of PTAs has demonstrated the ex-
post benefit of concluding an agreement with a large trading partner (Krishna 1998; Michaely
1998). We expect similar motivations to exist in the negotiation stage of a PTA’s life. Replacing
GDP with population-based measures produces similar results.
We also include an indication of the countries’ economic complementarity (similarity). Similarity is
calculated as the inverse of the difference between the per capita GDPs of both dyad members.
Trade between country pairs with a large difference in per capita GDP is likely to reflect
8comparative advantage, while smaller differences are more likely to reflect vertical production
networks and intra-industry trade (Manger 2009; Manger 2012). Consequently, the difference in
domestic coalitions should have an impact on the likelihood of PTA ratification, with
verticalisation (and similarity) being positively associated with PTA ratification.
Bilateral trade flows have long been linked to PTA formation, as these flows indicate strong
domestic interests favouring economic integration (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989; Magee 2003). As
the importance of bilateral trade grows, the coalitions that benefit from it have an incentive to
lobby intensively for PTAs to prevent the breakdown of close regional cooperation (Nye 1998;
Plouffe 2012). For these market actors, PTAs offer a credible signal of policy consistency,
preventing opportunistic behaviour by signatory governments (Yarbourgh and Yarbourgh 1992;
Barbieri and Keshk 2012). Trade captures the proportion of bilateral trade flows as a portion of
the dyad’s combined GDP. We use bilateral export volumes from CoW to account for trade
flows (Barbieri and Keshk 2012).
We additionally control for a number of political factors. Democracies are more cooperative in
comparison to nondemocratic regimes, due in part to the domestic political benefits that are the
result of cooperative agreements (Mansfield et al. 2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Jensen
2003). We use the ubiquitous Polity IV index to capture domestic regime (Marshall 2013) of each
dyad member, including this in the model as the difference between each country’s regime
(dpolity). We also include indicators of former colonial ties within the dyad (colony) and shared
linguistic heritage (language) as both of these socio-political factors foster international exchange
(Rose 2007).
Finally, countries that largely share foreign-policy goals have a greater probability of establishing
PTAs. Dyad members with similar foreign policies should be less wary of trade’s security
externalities than those with diverse foreign policies (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994;
Mansfield 1998). One way to capture this is through voting similarity in the United Nations
General Assembly (affinity) (Voeten and Strezhnev 2013). Additionally, a dichotomous variable
measuring whether a country pair has a military alliance (alliance) is used to capture alliance-based
motivations, and is sourced from the CoW dataset (Gibler 2009). To capture security-based
incentives behind PTA formation, we include the absolute value of the difference in dyad
members’ CINC scores from the CoW dataset (Singer and Small 1973) to provide an index of
relative capabilities. These are complemented by s_uw, an indicator of shared foreign-policy
interests based on treaty-membership portfolios (Lupu 2014); this is comparable to measures of
alliance portfolios, but like UNGA voting, attempts to capture a wider range of issues than
security concerns.13
5. Analyses and Results
Preliminary Analysis: Bivariate Effects
We begin by examining the bivariate relationship between diplomatic ties and PTAs. Table 2
presents the bivariate marginal effects from logit regressions depicting changes in the probability
of a PTA as a result of different levels of diplomacy. Overall, we find a positive and significant
link between diplomatic representation and the likelihood of PTA establishment.
9The uncontrolled effect of mutual ambassadors stands out, which corresponds with the
expectation that high-level diplomatic representations have a greater effect on the probability of
establishing a PTA than relatively low-level ties. The presence of dual ambassadors makes the
existence of a PTA between the country pair 17.5% more likely to occur, while this drops to
5.2% with the presence of a single ambassador. Similarly, the mutual presence of chargés
d’affaires increases the probability of a PTA for a country pair by 9.9%, compared to 7.8% with
unilateral presence. Finally, uneven ties consisting of an ambassador and chargé d’affaires
(presented in Model 3) are associated with a 10.2% increase in the likelihood of PTA formation.
This first cut at the data reveals the potential for a very strong link between the high-level
diplomatic ties that reflect important bilateral relationships and the formation of PTAs.
Table 2. Bivariate Marginal Effect of Diplomatic Representation on PTAs
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Mutual Ambassadors 0.175***
(0.007)
Unilateral Ambassador 0.052***
(0.006)
Ambassador- Chargé d’Affaires 0.102***
(0.015)
Mutual Chargés d’Affaires 0.099*
(0.044)
Unilateral Chargé d’Affaires 0.078***
(0.011)
Observations 91,764 91,764 91,764 91,764 91,764
Note: Models are bivariate logits with average marginal effects reported, and all diplomatic variables are lagged ten
years. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically robust and clustered on the dyad. Dependent variable:
PTA. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Multivariate Analyses
The multivariate tests presented in Table 3 are based on a combination of the Baier-Bergstrand
and Rose models. We extend these to include the difference in dyad members’ regime type
(dpolity) as well as our measures of diplomatic ties. We run our initial tests over two samples: one
includes the entire world (Models 6 and 7); the other excludes dyads where at least one country is
a member of the European Union (EU) (Models 8 and 9). Since the signing of the Treaty of
Rome, the EU is responsible for members’ external trade policies, including the creation of
PTAs. As such, PTAs with EU members run the risk of being counted numerous times,
potentially inflating results.
Models 6 and 8 present the effects of aggregated diplomatic ties. All AMB captures both
unilateral and bilateral ambassador-level representation, while All CDA does the same for
chargés d’affaires. In both cases, the presence of at least one ambassador increases the likelihood
of a PTA by at least 5%. All CDA has an insignificant effect, despite possessing a positive sign in
Model 6, but gains significance in Model 8. In Models 7 and 9, we incorporate more detailed
diplomatic-tie indicators. Mutual AMB and Mutual CDA capture bilateral ties of equal strength at
the ambassadorial and chargé d’affaires level, respectively. Unilateral AMB and Unilateral CDA
record dyads involving a single ambassador or chargé d’affaires, while CDA-AMB indicates ties
of uneven strength involving one chargé d’affaires and one ambassador. The omitted baseline
category consists of dyads lacking any form of diplomatic representation.
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Ambassadorial ties remain significantly and positively linked to PTA formation in both Model 7
and Model 9. The presence of mutual ambassadors increases the likelihood of a PTA by 7.3%
for the global model and 10.2% when the EU is excluded. The impact of a single ambassador is
smaller, at 3.3% and 4.5% respectively. Mutual CDA and does not have a significant impact on
PTA formation, although it retains a positive sign in both models, while Unilateral CDA exhibits
a significant and positive effect on PTA formation. This increases from 4% to 7.3% when the
EU is excluded. Finally, CDA-AMB is insignificant with a negative sign.
Table 3. Diplomacy and Basic Specifications
All Countries World Ex. EU
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
All AMB 0.054*** 0.072***
(0.006) (0.007)
All CDA 0.016 0.040**
(0.010) (0.013)
Mutual AMB 0.073*** 0.102***
(0.008) (0.010)
Unilateral AMB 0.033*** 0.045***
(0.008) (0.010)
CDA-AMB -0.010 -0.012
(0.020) (0.024)
Mutual CDA 0.039 0.093
(0.038) (0.024)
Unilateral CDA 0.040* 0.073**
(0.018) (0.019)
GDP i 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP j 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Similarity 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade 0.106 0.072 0.011 -0.034
(0.057) (0.057) (0.067) (0.068)
Remoteness 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proximity 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
DPolity -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 45,386 45,386 34,951 34,951
Pseudo-R2 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.17
AIC 32,995 32,959 27,739 27,964
Note: Logit regressions with average marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically
robust and clustered on the dyad. Table A8 replicates Models 8 and 9 for post-1990 and post-1995 data. *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Our control terms largely have the expected effects on PTA formation, as established through
the significant body of research on determinants of PTAs. Of the variables added to the basic
model, trade is positive but insignificant, while dpolity reflects the fact that states are more likely to
sign a PTA with another state of a similar regime type. This is unsurprising, given the established
link between democracies and international cooperation (Mansfield et al. 2000). However, this
seems to be driven by the relatively high correlation with Mutual AMB and All AMB, reflecting
the robust results linking the two in the economic diplomacy literature.14
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Table 4 presents the results of our fully specified models. In addition to the controls presented in
Table 3, we have included measures of foreign-policy affinity (affinity), the difference between
each country’s material capabilities (DCINC), and indicators of an existing alliance, colonial
history (colony), and common language. While the effects of diplomatic representation are reduced
when compared to those in Table 3, the same general pattern emerges. As Models 10 and 12
demonstrate, the presence of at least one ambassador increases the likelihood of a PTA by 4.5%,
and 5.6% when the EU is excluded. Chargés d’affaires only exhibit a positive and significant
effect in Model 12. For our disaggregated diplomacy indicators, presented in Models 11 and 13,
Mutual AMB is linked to a 6.1% increase in the probability of PTA formation (7.9% in Model
13), while Unilateral AMB’s impact is much smaller, at about 3% in both models. Our variables
capturing chargés d’affaires are not significantly linked to PTA formation, with the exception of
Unilateral CDA in Model 13.
Table 4 – Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
All Countries World Ex. EU
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
All AMB 0.045*** 0.056***
(0.006) (0.007)
All CDA 0.014 0.031*
(0.011) (0.014)
Mutual AMB 0.061*** 0.079***
(0.008) (0.010)
Unilateral AMB 0.030*** 0.037***
(0.008) (0.009)
CDA-AMB -0.011 -0.022
(0.021) (0.023)
Mutual CDA 0.051 0.088
(0.056) (0.081)
Unilateral CDA 0.033 0.063**
(0.020) (0.024)
GDP i 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
GDP j 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Similarity 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade 0.056 0.032 -0.003 -0.033
(0.062) (0.063) (0.074) (0.075)
Remoteness 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proximity 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.009*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
DPolity 4.76x10-5 1.04x10-4 1.57x10-4 2.05x10-4
(0.001) (0.001) (4.71x10-4) (4.71x10-4)
Affinity 0.278*** 0.278*** 0.406*** 0.407***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.040) (0.040)
DCINC -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Alliance -0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Colony 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Language 0.017* 0.016* 0.034*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 33,655 33,657 26,745 26,745
Pseudo-R2 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.21
AIC 22,388 22,372 18,923 18,901
12
Note: Logit regressions with average marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically
robust and clustered on the dyad. Because data for affinity do not cover 2005, we have roughly 12,000 fewer
observations in each model. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Tables A4 and A5 replicate this table with five-year
and fifteen-year lags, respectively. Table A9 replicates Models 12 and 13 for post-1990 data with fifteen-year lags.
The addition of our extended battery of political controls changes some of the results from our
baseline model. DPolity loses significance and changes sign when compared to the results in
Table 3. Trade remains insignificant, although our economic and geographic controls remain
significant and retain their signs and comparable marginal effects to those in the previous table.
Affinity, our measure of foreign-policy similarity, is strongly linked to PTA formation, with an
increase of one standard deviation increasing the probability of a PTA by over 27% in Models 10
and 11, and 40% in Models 12 and 13. The effect of relative capabilities (DCINC) points to
PTAs being signed between countries of relatively equal material strength. Alliances and shared
colonial history are not significantly linked to PTA formation, while common language increases
the likelihood of a PTA by up to 2% across specifications.
Substantively, the effects of ambassadors on PTA formation are quite substantial when
compared to other commonly cited factors. For example, the presence of a single ambassador
has approximately twice the impact as a common language, while mutual ambassadors within the
dyad increases the likelihood of a PTA by roughly four times the effect of a common language.
When the EU is excluded, ambassadorial presence remains very important, while language
increases in importance and significance.15
Cross-Sectional Analyses
Following influential examples in both PTAs and economic diplomacy literatures we draw from,
we also present several cross-sectional models.16 For these tests, we present more variation on
the lags of our diplomatic indicators. We use 2000 as the year for our cross-sectional analyses for
two reasons: most PTAs have been formed after the end of the Cold War, and affinity does not
contain data for 2005. We also exclude all dyads involving EU members.
Table 5 presents results for these models with diplomatic links as they existed in 1975 (Models
14 and 15) and in 1985 (Models 16 and 17). The remaining independent variables are not lagged.
The results indicate that, despite the significant geopolitical changes that happened between the
observed diplomatic ties during the Cold War and 2000, a relationship remains between mutual
ambassadors and PTA formation, although any consistent relationship between weaker ties and
PTAs disappears. For the aggregate measure All AMB, lagged twenty-five years, the marginal
effect is positive and comparable to All AMB’s fifteen-year lag. The disaggregated indicator for
mutual ambassadorial ties from 1975 is associated with a 4.8% increase in the likelihood of PTA
formation (although this is not significant with 95% confidence), with dyads containing only one
ambassador increasing the probability of a PTA by 6.4%. The models with fifteen year lags,
where diplomatic data reflect the world in 1985, exhibit a stronger relationship with PTAs, with
All AMB increasing PTA formation by 5.7% and Mutual AMB increasing the probability of a
PTA in 2000 by 5.9%. The presence of a single ambassador in a dyad in 1985 increases the
likelihood of PTA formation by 2000 by 6.5%.
Table 5. Diplomacy and PTAs in 2000, World Excluding the EU
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25-year Diplomatic Lag 15-year Diplomatic Lag
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
All AMB 0.051*** 0.057***
(0.014) (0.016)
All CDA -0.014 0.023
(0.033) (0.029)
Mutual AMB 0.048* 0.059**
(0.020) (0.021)
Unilateral AMB 0.064*** 0.065**
(0.017) (0.020)
CDA-AMB -0.148** -0.061
(0.052) (0.050)
Mutual CDA -.003 0.024
(0.145) (0.089)
Unilateral CDA 0.114 0.056
(0.074) (0.041)
GDP i 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP j 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Similarity 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade -0.497*** -0.483*** -0.529*** -0.527***
(0.125) (0.127) (0.123) (0.124)
Remoteness 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proximity 0.021 0.020 0.022* 0.022*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
DPolity -0.003** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Affinity 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.380*** 0.380***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059)
DCINC -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Alliance 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.078** 0.078**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Colony 0.055** 0.054** 0.054** 0.054**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Language 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.111***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 4,985 4,985 5,096 5,096
Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33
AIC 4,226 4,226 4,271 4,276
Note: Logit regressions with average marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically
robust and clustered on the dyad. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 6 presents estimates for 10-year and 5-year diplomatic lags. The impact of these post-Cold
War indicators reflects the change in the global political economy, with mutual ambassadorial ties
more closely linked to PTA formation. The extent to which this relationship reflects structural
changes in international politics or the evolving mission of diplomatic corps is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the presence of mutual ambassadors in 1990 is linked to a 9.1% increase in the
likelihood of PTA formation by 2000, while the same indicator from 1995 increases the
probability of a PTA in 2000 by 13.1%. Unilateral ambassadorial ties are also strongly linked to
PTAs, with marginal effects of 8.0% and 4.7%.
From a substantive standpoint, the importance of ambassadorial ties varies depending on the
length of the lag between observation of the bilateral diplomatic relationship and 2000. For the
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longest lags, with diplomatic ties from 1975 and 1985, ambassadors’ effects are comparable to
those of a shared colonial history. With the ten- and five-year lags, these effects are more similar
to those of a common language.
Table 6. Diplomacy and PTAs in 2000, World Excluding the EU
10-year Diplomatic Lag 5-year Diplomatic Lag
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
All AMB 0.081*** 0.085***
(0.016) (0.014)
All CDA 0.913 0.023
(0.029) (0.022)
Mutual AMB 0.091*** 0.131***
(0.021) (0.019)
Unilateral AMB 0.080*** 0.047**
(0.020) (0.017)
CDA-AMB -0.039 0.004
(0.053) (0.042)
Mutual CDA 0.285 0.052
(0.350) (0.089)
Unilateral CDA 0.036 0.051
(0.046) (0.034)
GDP i 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP j 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Similarity 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Trade -0.525*** -0.541*** -0.222** -0.288**
(0.121) (0.124) (0.099) (0.101)
Remoteness 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proximity 0.015 0.014 -0.011 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
DPolity -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Affinity 0.364*** 0.366*** 0.364*** 0.363***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.043) (0.043)
DCINC -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Alliance 0.083*** 0.082** 0.095*** 0.086***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Colony 0.042** 0.042** 0.047** 0.049***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Language 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.142*** 0.137***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 5,254 5,254 7,206 7,206
Pseudo-R2 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33
AIC 4,389 4,392 5,420 5,408
Note: Logit regressions with average marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically
robust and clustered on the dyad. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
In both Tables 5 and 6, our control variables behave largely as expected. The notable exception
here is trade, which has a negative and significant effect for the models involving 10- and 15-year
diplomatic lags.17 Affinity again emerges as particularly influential, with a standard-deviation
increase in shared UNGA voting behaviours making a PTA at least 35%-40% more likely.
The results for post-Cold War diplomatic ties raise questions regarding the nature of the
relationship between embassies and PTAs. On the one hand, the stronger link could reflect the
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conscious shift on behalf of foreign ministries towards economic diplomacy, with PTAs viewed
as a natural means of achieving goals of enhanced trade and investment relations. On the other
hand, these embassies could be established as a way of expediting ongoing PTA negotiations.
Launching a new embassy is a highly costly venture, so any potential PTA that would merit such
an activity would need to be expected to result in very significant trade creation or diversion to
offset the costs of embassy creation.18
Two-Stage Model
While we have demonstrated the effects of diplomatic representation on PTA formation through
single-stage models, the likelihood remains that many of the factors contributing to PTA
formation may also lead to the creation of high-level diplomatic missions. To separate these
effects, we employ a two-stage logit. In this model, two first-stage logits are used to predict
diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial and chargé d’affaires levels (predallamb and predallcda,
respectively). These are then nested into the second stage, which predicts PTAs.
In the first stage models, we rely on the full available sample of countries. EU members have
discretion over their diplomatic relations, unlike the formation of PTAs. Our specifications for
predicting diplomatic ties differ, both from each other, and from our PTA-formation models, in
order to obtain accurate predicted values. While diplomatic links within a dyad are prone to
change over time, previously existing links are a valuable predictor for future links. It is also
interesting to note that a number of indicators that contribute to the prediction of predallamb
have no impact on predallcda. Table 7 presents our applied specifications for the first stage
predictors. Previous diplomatic ties, GDP, proximity, trade, and alliances are the common predictors
across both quantities of interest. The sign for trade flips between the two, illustrating the
influence of economic considerations in diplomatic affairs. Both s_uw and war are strong
predictors of ambassadorial ties; affinity, while strongly linked to PTA formation, is omitted from
both of these models as it conceptually overlaps with s_uw and is closely linked econometrically
to either predallamb or predallcda.
Table 7 also includes the second-stage results for 1990. S_uw’s inclusion in the first stage limits
the temporal scope of the full model without the addition of lags (presented in Table 8). The
results using predicted diplomatic ties are similar to those using actual ties in a single stage.
Predallamb has an average marginal effect (AME) of 9.2% or 9.9%, depending on the
specification. Predallcda is not significantly linked to PTA formation, despite possessing a positive
sign. This may be partially a consequence of the difficulty of predicting diplomatic ties at this
level.19
Table 8 presents second-stage results with ten and fifteen-year lags on the predicted diplomatic
ties. Both sets of models use data from 1990 on, to avoid potentially inflating significance levels,
given the relative lack of PTA formation during the Cold War. The marginal effects of our
controls in Models 24 and 26, as well as in Models 25 and 27, are fairly stable and largely
comparable to those from our single-stage models. The AMEs for predallamb are largely similar to
those from the single-stage models as well: with 10-year lags, a predicted ambassador is linked to
a 7% increase in the likelihood of PTA formation, while with 15-year lags, this rises to more than
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10%. Predallcda is not significantly linked to PTA formation, mirroring results from previous
tests.
Table 7. Two-Stage Models, First Stage and Second Stage without Lags
First Stage Second Stage
Predallamb Predallcda Excluding EU, 1990
Model 22 Model 23
Predicted All AMB 0.092*** 0.099***
(0.025) (0.026)
Predicted All CDA 0.054 0.051
(0.070) (0.079)
All AMB 0.040*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.002)
All CDA 0.117*** 0.279***
(0.014) (0.013)
GDP i 0.026*** 0.005*** 0.032*** 0.050***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP j 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.027*** 0.042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Similarity 0.050*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003)
Trade 0.749*** -0.159*** -0.323* 0.018
(0.048) (0.017) (0.127) (0.136)
Remoteness 0.008*** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Proximity 0.048*** 0.008*** 0.012 0.008
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
DPolity -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Affinity 0.728***
(0.084)
DCINC 0.014*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.003)
Alliance 0.018* 0.009** -0.033
(0.007) (0.003) (0.018)
Colony 0.043***
(0.018)
Language 0.062*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.016)
War -0.214***
(0.061)
S_UW 0.185***
(0.022)
Observations 35,562 60,332 4,659 4,446
Pseudo-R2 0.48 0.19 0.11 0.19
AIC 23,618 15,099 3,899 3,431
Note: Logit regressions with average marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically
robust and clustered on the dyad. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 8. Two-Stage Models, Second Stage with Lags, Post-1990 (Excluding the EU)
10-year Lagged Predictions 15-year Lagged Predictions
Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27
Predicted All AMB 0.075*** 0.071** 0.108*** 0.125***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025)
Predicted All CDA -0.002 0.010 -0.001 -0.008
(0.054) (0.058) (0.049) (0.058)
GDP i 0.018*** 0.044*** 0.015*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
GDP j 0.014*** 0.041*** 0.009* 0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Similarity 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.054***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Trade -0.262* -0.315** -0.227* -0.350**
(0.114) (0.119) (0.111) (0.126)
Remoteness 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Proximity 0.021* 0.008 0.023* -0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
DPolity -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -4.33x10-4
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Affinity 0.344*** 0.351***
(0.050) (0.054)
DCINC -0.030*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.004)
Alliance 0.012 0.010
(0.018) (0.019)
Colony 0.053** 0.053**
(0.017) (0.018)
Language 0.048** 0.034*
(0.014) (0.015)
Observations 12,997 12,435 15,892 10,918
Pseudo-R2 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.23
AIC 11,945 11,162 14,841 9,931
Note: Logit regressions with average marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastically
robust and clustered on the dyad. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
6. Conclusion
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of international economic cooperation.
However, the existing research has largely ignored the influence of bilateral diplomatic ties. We
argue that diplomats have professional incentives to form PTAs; these motivations are
augmented by high-level missions. Our results show that ambassadorial ties can have a
significant influence on the likelihood of a country pair forging a trade agreement.
In this study, we argue that high-level diplomatic ties increase the probability of PTA formation
between pairs of countries and provide the first analysis that this is the case. We study two levels
of diplomatic representation with a battery of economic and political controls and find evidence
to support our argument. In our panel analyses, we find an increase of approximately 5% in the
probability of PTA formation between dyad members when mutual ambassadors are present.
Single ambassadors increase the probability of a PTA by roughly 3%, while dyads with chargés
d’affaires display no significant relationship with PTA formation. In our cross-section tests, we
find a consistent positive significant relationship between ambassadorial ties with lags of up to 25
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years and PTAs. Finally, our two-stage models incorporating predicted diplomatic ties exhibit a
strong relationship between these predicted links and PTAs.
This paper illustrates one of the effects of economic diplomacy, providing a first examination of
the relationship between bilateral diplomatic ties and PTAs. It is perhaps unsurprising that
similarity in foreign policy makes country more likely to form trade agreements, but this
highlights potential for further research on diplomacy and its effects on foreign economic policy.
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